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NEW TRIALS - JUROR MISCONDUCT - EVIDENCE -
WHERE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS BASED ON JURY'S EX-
POSURE TO EXTRANEOUS MATTER DURING DELIBERA-
TIONS, MOVANT MUST SHOW PROBABLE PREJUDICE -
JURORS' AFFIDAVITS ARE INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Wernsing v. General Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 470 A.2d 802 (1984). 
In Wernsing v. General Motors Corp., 1 a personal injury action, a 
major issue at trial was whether the defendants proximately caused the 
plaintiffs' injuries.2 Following a verdict for the plaintiffs, the defendants 
learned that the jury had consulted a dictionary during its deliberations 
and had consequently arrived at an incorrect legal definition of the term 
"proximate cause."3 The defendants moved for a new trial on the 
grounds of juror misconduct.4 In support of their motion, the defendants 
offered three categories of evidence: jurors' affidavits describing their ex-
posure to the dictionary; testimony by the court bailiff concerning his 
role in supplying the jury with a dictionary; and longhand notes written 
during the jury's deliberations, including an essentially verbatim copy of 
a definition contained in the dictionary.s The trial court denied the new 
trial motion,6 but the court of special appeals reversed, basing its decision 
1. 298 Md. 406, 470 A.2d 802 (1984). 
2. The defendants were General Motors Corp., Gladding Chevrolet, Inc., and Howard 
L. Seidel. Ms. Wernsing and her children brought suit when the car driven by Mr. 
Seidel struck Ms. Wernsing in a parking lot. General Motors and Gladding Chevro-
let contended that Seidel's negligent driving caused the accident. Seidel, on the 
other hand, claimed the accident was caused by a defective cruise control mecha-
nism. Both issues were submitted to the jury on special interrogatories. Wernsing, 
298 Md. at 408-09, 470 A.2d at 803-04. 
3. Id. at 408, 414, 470 A.2d at 803, 806. 
4. Id. at 408-10, 470 A.2d at 803-04. At the outset of the trial, the judge specifically 
instructed the jury to refrain from consulting dictionaries, lawbooks, or records not 
in evidence. Brieffor Appellee Seidel at 9, Wernsing v. General Motors Corp., 298 
Md. 406, 470 A.2d 802 (1984). 
5. Wernsing, 298 Md. at 410-11, 414, 470 A.2d at 804, 806. In the affidavits, four 
jurors swore that the dictionary definition caused them to respond affirmatively to 
the judge's special interrogatory inquiring whether the cruise control mechanism 
was defective and therefore proximately caused the accident. Id. at 411,470 A.2d at 
804. The defendants also offered the affidavit of a bystander who learned of the 
dictionary incident from a juror. !d. at 411-12, 470 A.2d at 804. 
The longhand notes established that during its deliberations, the jury requested 
further clarification of the term "proximate cause." In response, the judge in-
structed them that "proximate cause is legal cause." Id. at 413, 470 A.2d at 806. 
The trial judge considered supplying the jury with a dictionary definition of "proxi-
mately," but deferred to defendant Seidel's argument that such a definition might 
mislead the jury. Brieffor Appellee Seidel at 9, Wernsing v. General Motors Corp., 
298 Md. 406, 470 A.2d 802 (1984). Without the knowledge of court or counsel, the 
jury foreman then obtained a dictionary from the bailiff and, on the reverse side of 
the note to and from the judge, wrote: "page 482 Webster's Seventh New Collegiate 
dictionary/ Legal cause/ having a formal status derived from law often without 
basis in actual fact." Wernsing v. General Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 414, 470 
A.2d 802, 806 (1984). 
6. Wernsing, 298 Md. at 414, 470 A.2d at 806. The trial judge refused to consider the 
jurors' affidavits and the other evidence. Id. 
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on all of the proffered evidence.7 Although the court of appeals deter-
mined that Maryland law required the exclusion of the jurors' affidavits, 8 
the court held that the defendants' remaining evidence established a 
probability of prejudice sufficiently high to warrant remanding the case 
for a new trial. 9 
The rule that a juror will not be heard to impeach his own verdict 
originated with Lord Mansfield's opinion in Vaise v. De/ava/.1O Prior to 
Vaise, "the unquestioned practice had been to receive jurors' testimony 
or affidavits without scruple."ll Currently, most American jurisdictions 
follow a general rule prohibiting the admission of jurors' post-verdict affi-
davits, but countenance exceptions. 12 For example, Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 606(b),13 adopted in some form by fifteen states, 14 permits jurors to 
describe exposure to extraneous prejudicial information or improper 
outside influences, but not the effect of such information or influences 
upon the jurors' votes. Other states employ a similar rule adopted by 
judicial fiat or legislation not expressly patterned after Federal Rule 
606(b).IS Other recognized exceptions to the nonimpeachment rule in-
clude an exception that permits juror affidavits sustaining the verdict, 16 
and the aliunde rule which allows impeachment by jurors if the evidence 
of juror misconduct originates from a competent source outside of the 
jury.J7 
A small minority of states has rejected the general nonimpeachment 
rule in favor of a rule allowing impeachment, the "Iowa rule,"18 under 
7. General Motors Corp. v. Wemsing, 54 Md. App. 19,23-24,30,456 A.2d 939, 942, 
945 (1983), afJ'd on other grounds, 298 Md. 406, 470 A.2d 802 (1984). . 
8. 298 Md. at 411-12, 470 A.2d at 804-05. The court of appeals also excluded the 
affidavit of the bystander as merely attempting to prove the truth of the contents of 
statements made by the foreman in a post-verdict conversation between certain ju-
rors. Id. at 412, 470 A.2d at 805. 
9. Id. at 420, 470 A.2d at 809. 
10. 99 Eng. Rep. 944, 944 (K.B. 1785). In Vaise, the court excluded jurors' affidavits 
establishing that they reached the verdict by flipping a coin. Id. 
11. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2352, at 696 (J. Mc-
Naughton ed. 1961). 
12. Id. at § 2354. For a state-by-state listing of the various rules and exceptions, see id. 
at note 2. For a summary of Supreme Court decisions dealing with the 
nonimpeachment rule, see Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts in Arizona, 21 
ARIZ. L. REV. 821, 824-27 (1979). 
13. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
14. J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2354 n.2 (Supp. 1983). 
15. Eg., Nichols v. Seaboard Coastline Ry., 341 So. 2d 671, 673 (Ala. 1977); Khaalis v. 
United States, 408 A.2d 313, 359 (D.C. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092 (1980); 
People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 393, 399 N.E.2d 51, 53, 423 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463 
(1979). 
16. J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2354 nn.9-1O. 
17. Wicker v. Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 434, 436, 83 N.E.2d 56, 57 (1948), codified in 
OHIO R. EVID. 606(B). The Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected the aliunde rule 
in Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 101,447 A.2d 860, 870 (1982). 
18. Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866); accord State v. Green, 254 
Iowa 1379, 121 N.W.2d 89 (1963); Gardner v. Malone, 60 Wash. 2d 836, 376 P.2d 
651 (1962); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.607(2)(b) (West 1979). 
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which juror affidavits are competent to prove "any matter. . which 
does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself," or those matters not 
"resting alone in the juror's breast."19 
Maryland courts have long adhered to the principle that on a mo-
tion for new trial, a juror may not be heard to impeach his own verdict, 
regardless of whether the conduct objected to consists of misbehavior or 
mistake.20 The first reported application of the rule by a Mary land court 
occurred in 1831,21 and in 1864 the Court of Appeals of Maryland un-
equivocally adopted the rule. 22 Over the years, Maryland courts have 
invoked the nonimpeachment rule to exclude juror affidavits23 pertaining 
to various forms of misconduct or mistake. 24 
Courts in Maryland have advanced a number of policy reasons in 
support of the absolute rule prohibiting a juror from impeaching his own 
verdict: the upholding of verdict finality,25 the prevention of perjury by 
jurors,26 the prevention of tampering with 27 or harrassment of jurors,28 
the preservation of public confidence in the judicial process,29 and the 
19. Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210 (1866). 
20. E.g., Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 101,447 A.2d 860, 870 (1982); Williams v. 
State, 204 Md. 55, 67, 102 A.2d 714, 720 (1954); Bosley v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 3 
G. & J. 450, note at 473-74 (1831). 
The rule applies with equal force to jurors' post-verdict affidavits and to jurors' 
post-verdict testimony. Christ v. Wempe, 219 Md. 627, 641, 150 A.2d 918, 925 
(1959). Similarly, the rule operates without regard to whether an action is civil or 
criminal. Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55,72, 102 A.2d 714, 722 (1954). According to 
Poe, where a new trial is sought because one or more jurors lacked the requisite 
qualifications, the juror(s) may testify, but only upon that issue. 3J. POE, POE'S 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 352 (H. Sachs, Jr. 6th ed. 1975). 
21. See Bosley v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 3 G. & J. 450, note at 473-74 (1831). The Mary-
land cases do not refer to the principle as "Lord Mansfield's rule." 
22. Browne v. Browne, 22 Md. 103, 113 (1864) ("To allow a verdict of a jury solemnly 
rendered, to be afterwards impeached. . . would, we think, be setting a dangerous 
precedent, tending in most cases to the defeat of justice. "); see also Ford v. State, 12 
Md. 514, 546 (1859) Gurors may not reconsider or alter verdict after it has been 
recorded). 
23. The rule does not require exclusion of affidavits of bystanders having first-hand 
knowledge of the misconduct. Christ v. Wempe, 219 Md. 627, 642,150 A.2d 918, 
926 (1959); cf Zeller v. Mayson, 168 Md. 663, 673, 179 A. 179, 184 (1935) (non-
juror's affidavit attesting to juror misconduct excluded as pure hearsay). 
24. E.g., Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83,99,447 A.2d 860, 869-70 (1982) (coercion 
and intimidation of one juror by others; unauthorized medical treatise in jury 
room); Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55, 72, 102 A.2d 714, 722 (1954) Gury motivated 
by racial prejudice); Kelly v. Huber Baking Co., 145 Md. 321, 328-29, 125 A. 782, 
785 (1924) (outsider tampered with jurors); Browne v. Browne, 22 Md. 103, 113 
(1864) Gurors assented to verdict solely in order that ailing juror might go home); 
Dixon v. State, 27 Md. App. 443, 449, 340 A.2d 396, 400 (1975) (improper consid-
eration of defendant's prior conviction for similar offense), cerro denied, 276 Md. 
741 (1975). 
25. Bosley V. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 3 G. & J. 450, note at 473-74 (1831). 
26. Brinsfield V. Howeth, 110 Md. 520, 530,73 A. 289, 294 (1909). 
27. [d. 
28. Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55, 67, 102 A.2d 714, 720 (1954). 
29. [d. 
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promotion of frankness and freedom of discussion among jurors.30 De-
spite the existence of dicta intimating that the nonimpeachment rule 
might be relaxed in appropriate circumstances,3l Maryland courts have 
rigidly applied the rule.32 At present, a mere handful of other states 
share Maryland's absolute ban on verdict impeachment by jurors.33 
Prior to Wernsing, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had never ad-
dressed the problem of a jury's exposure to unauthorized dictionary deft-
nitions. 34 Courts in several other states, however, have dealt with the 
issue.35 In the overwhelming majority of such cases, courts have granted 
30. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264,267 (1915), quoted in Williams v. State, 204 Md. 
55,70, 102 A.2d 714, 721 (1954). For a discussion of the problems raised by jurors' 
revelations of their deliberations in the context of post-trial publicity, see Note, Pub-
lic Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1983). 
31. E.g., Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55,71,102 A.2d 714,722 (1954) (perhaps admissi-
ble in appropriate independent criminal proceeding); Dixon v. State, 27 Md. App. 
443,448, 340 A.2d 396, 400 (1975) (same). 
32. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
33. E.g., Eichel v. Payeur, 106 N.H. 484, 486, 214 A.2d 116, 118 (1965); Barsh v. 
Chrysler Corp., 262 S.c. 129,203 S.E.2d 107 (1974). In New Hampshire, although 
jurors may never impeach their verdict, they may sustain (i.e., defend) it. Palmer v. 
State, 65 N.H. 221, 222, 19 A. 1003, 1003 (1890). 
34. The issue of improper exposure to definitions contained in D.E. AARONSON, MARY-
LAND CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND COMMENTARY 18-28 (1978) has arisen 
in the context of a motion for mistrial in a criminal case. Hebb v. State, 44 Md. App. 
678, 684, 410 A.2d 622, 625 (1980) (conviction reversed: as a "treasurehouse of 
confusion and misinformation," the book created a likelihood of prejudice to the 
defendant). 
In Maryland, as in most states, statutes prescribe what jurors may take with 
them into the jury room. The statutes in effect during the Wernsing trial, Md. R.P. 
558 (civil) and 758 (criminal), provided that jurors were entitled to their personal 
notes, but that the court had to approve all other items. The pertinent revised rules 
of Maryland procedure, 2-521 and 4-326, contain the same provisions. 
A few general principles have evolved from Maryland cases dealing with other 
forms of juror misconduct. Once the Maryland litigant seeking a new trial on the 
basis of juror misconduct offers evidence originating from a source other than ju-
rors, the issues become: "whether the alleged misconduct is sufficiently made out; 
and ... whether it affected the verdict." J. POE, supra note 20, at 696. In motions 
both for new trial and for mistrial, the movant bears the burden of showing the 
requisite degree of injury - there is no presumption of prejudice. See, e.g., Presley 
v. State, 224 Md. 550, 555, 168 A.2d 510,512 (1961) (in motion for mistrial based 
on prejudicial publicity, movant must show juror read and was influenced by preju-
dicial matter), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 957 (1962); Christ v. Wempe, 219 Md. 627, 
642, 150 A.2d 918, 926 (1959) (not every act of misconduct requires a new trial). 
Misconduct warrants a new trial if it "justif[ies] the belief that the fairness of the 
trial is impaired and injury resulted." Christ, 219 Md. at 643, 150 A.2d at 926 
(citing Rent-A-Car Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 163 Md. 401, 409, 163 A. 
702, 705 (1933». The trial court's ruling on either motion will be disturbed only 
where the court has clearly abused its discretion. State v. Devers, 260 Md. 360, 376, 
272 A.2d 794,802 (1971); Martin v. Rossignol, 226 Md. 363, 366-67, 174 A.2d 149, 
151 (1961); Rent-A-Car, 163 Md. at 409, 163 A. at 705. Motions for mistrial differ 
from motions for new trial in a crucial respect: jurors may supply testimony or 
affidavits regarding their misconduct in the former context but not in the latter. 
See, e.g., Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Smith, 222 Md. 206, 159 A.2d 823 (1960); Rent-A-
Car, 163 Md. 401, 163 A. 702 (1933); J. POE, supra note 20, at § 348. 
35. See generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.2D 738 (1957 & Supp. 1978). 
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new trials only upon a satisfactory showing that the dictionary's presence 
had or could have had a prejudicial effect. 36 The reported decisions di-
verge on the type of proof necessary to show prejudice or the lack of 
prejudice, and on the requisite degree of prejudice.37 
In a minority of states, proof of the mere presence of a dictionary in 
the jury room creates a presumption of prejudice.38 The majority posi-
tion is that the movant must produce sufficient evidence to create an in-
ference of prejudice for the court to award a new trial. 39 In Kansas, the 
movant must show that the misconduct resulted in essentially prejudice 
in fact.40 Several courts, perhaps because the nonimpeachment rule pre-
vents a more certain proof of prejudice in fact, speak in terms of 
probability. Rather than prejudice in fact, the movant must show, for 
instance, that "injury probably resulted" to him;41 "the probable effect 
upon a hypothetical average jury would be prejudicial";42 "the extrane-
ous matter could have a tendency to influence the jury in. . . a manner 
inconsistent with the legal proofs and the court's charge";43 or that the 
extraneous matter "relates to the issues of the case and there is a reason-
able possibility of prejudice."44 
Courts applying these probable prejudice standards have resorted to 
numerous factors, singly and in combination, to decide whether the req-
uisite degree of prejudice (probable prejudice) to justify a new trial can be 
inferred from competent evidence proving that the jurors used a diction-
ary. In addition, courts in minority states use the same factors to deter-
mine whether the presumption of prejudice is rebutted. First, some 
courts consider whether the trial judge and counsel approved the delivery 
of the dictionary to the jury.45 Second, the opportunity for and the giv-
ing of curative instructions is another relevant factor.46 Third, courts 
may assume that the jury already knew the meanings of ordinary words47 
36. Id. at 739. 
37. See generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.2D 738 (1957 & Supp. 1978). 
38. E.g., Grissinger v. Griffin, 186 So. 2d 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Dongo v. 
Banks, 448 A.2d 885 (Me. 1982); Daniels v. Barker, 89 N.H. 416, 200 A. 410 
(1938); State v. Holmes, 17 Or. App. 464, 522 P.2d 900 (1974); State v. Holt, 79 
S.D. 50, 107 N.W.2d 732 (1961). The presumption of prejudice in these and similar 
cases does not appear to be conditioned upon the allowance or disallowance of ju-
rors' affidavits. All five states listed recognized exceptions to the nonimpeachment 
rule. None of the cases states that the presumption is irrebuttable. 
39. See generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.2D 738 (1957 & Supp. 1978). 
40. Pulkrabek v. Lampe, 179 Kan. 204, 209, 293 P.2d 998, 1002 (1956). 
41. TEX. R. CIV. P. 327; see also Kaufman v. Miller, 405 S.W.2d 820, 826 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 414 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1967). 
42. State v. Ott, 111 Wis. 2d 691, 696, 331 N.W.2d 629, 632 (1983). 
43. Palestroni v. Jacobs, 10 N.J. Super. 266, 271, 77 A.2d 183, 185 (1950). 
44. Kirby v. Rosell, 133 Ariz. 42, 45, 648 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1982). 
45. Dulaney v. Bums, 218 Ala. 493, 497, 119 So. 21, 25 (1928); Smith v. State, 95 So. 2d 
525, 527-28 (Fla. 1957). 
46. Schreiner v. State, 155 Neb. 894,898, 54 N.W.2d 224, 226 (1952); State v. McLain, 
10 N.C. App. 146, 148, 177 S.E.2d 742, 743 (1970). 
47. Dulaney v. Bums, 218 Ala. 493, 497, 119 So. 21, 25 (1928); In re Estate of Cory, 
169 N.W.2d 837, 846 (Iowa 1969). In denying the motion for a new trial in 
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or that the jury comprehended and followed the court's instructions.48 
Fourth, if the weight of evidence strongly supports the verdict, some 
courts deny the new trial motion regardless of the potentially prejudicial 
manner in which the jury reached the verdict.49 Finally, courts fre-
quently emphasize the specific words or terms involved. Where the word 
has no special legal meaning or has little relevance to the issues of the 
case, the verdict will stand. 50 Even where the word is a term of art or 
highly relevant to the case, many decisions require an injurious and de-
monstrable disparity between the dictionary definition and the court's 
definition. Thus, a court affirmed a verdict due to a lack of inconsistency 
between the dictionary definition of "proximate" and the court's expla-
nation of proximate causeY Conversely, a court ordered a new trial af-
ter determining that several standard dictionary definitions of 
"depravity" encompassed a broader range of conduct than the court's 
definition. 52 Should the legal and lay definitions differ substantially, 
courts may nevertheless ignore the disparity on the ground that the jury 
presumably relied on the court's definition53 or that the evidence over-
whelmingly supported the verdict. 54 Some courts have found prejudice 
by speculating as to what words the jury used a dictionary to define and 
then comparing the court's charge to the dictionary definition. 55 
The court of appeals in Wernsing 56 agreed with the court of special 
Wernsing, the trial court relied on this factor. Brief for Appellee Seidel at 16, 
Wemsing v. General Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 470 A.2d 802 (1984). 
48. Dulaney v. Bums, 218 Ala. 493, 497, 119 So. 21, 25 (1928); In re Estate of Cory, 
169 N.W.2d 837, 846 (Iowa 1969). Contra State v. Ott, 111 Wis. 2d 691, 696, 331 
N.W.2d 629, 632 (1983). 
49. Loucks v. Pierce, 341 Ill. App. 253, 93 N.E.2d 372 (1950); Amerine v. Hunter, 335 
S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Rocky Mountain Trucking Co. v. Taylor, 79 
Wyo. 461, 335 P.2d 448 (1959). 
50. See Loucks v. Pierce, 341 Ill. App. 253, 260, 93 N.E.2d 372, 376 (1950) (if definition 
is innocuous, new trial unnecessary); cf Palestroni v. Jacobs, 10 N.J. Super. 266, 
271, 77 A.2d 183, 185 (1950) ("wainscot" not used in court's instructions but im-
portant to facts of case; new trial ordered). For a criticism of Palestroni, see Annot., 
54 A.L.R.2D 738, 745 n.8 (1957 & Supp. 1978). 
51. Pulkrabek v. Lampe, 179 Kan. 204, 208-09, 293 P.2d 998, 1002 (1956); accord Sims 
v. McKnight, 420 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (involving definition of 
"preponderance"). 
52. State v. Ott, 111 Wis. 2d 691, 693-96, 331 N.W.2d 629,631 (1983); cf Traveler's 
Ins. Co. v. Carter, 298 S.W.2d 231,234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (no prejudice where 
dictionary definition is more favorable to movant than definition given by court). 
53. In re Estate of Cory, 169 N.W.2d 837, 846 (Iowa 1969); see also Dulaney v. Bums, 
218 Ala. 493, 497, 119 So. 21, 25 (1928). 
54. State v. Duncan, 3 Kan. App. 2d 271,593 P.2d 427 (1979); Rocky Mountain Truck-
ing Co. v. Taylor, 79 Wyo. 461, 335 P.2d 448 (1959). 
55. Gertz v. Bass, 59 Ill. App. 2d 180, 208 N.E.2d 113 (1965); Daniels v. Barker, 89 
N.H. 416, 200 A. 410 (1938). Gertz was implicitly rejected in People v. Jedlicka, 84 
Ill. App. 3d 483, 492, 405 N.E.2d 844, 851 (1980) (court declined to speculate 
whether jury looked up legal terms of art). 
56. Wemsing v. General Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 470 A.2d 802 (1984). 
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appeals57 that the trial judge abused his discretion in not awarding the 
defendants a new trial, but disapproved of the lower appellate court's 
consideration of the jurors' affidavits. 58 In holding the affidavits inad-
missible, the court of appeals cited a long line of Maryland precedent. 59 
The court viewed the affidavits as an impermissible attempt to undermine 
verdict finality by reconstructing individual jurors' mental processes.60 
Furthermore, the court rejected two potential exceptions to the 
nonimpeachment rule. Contrary to the view of the court of special ap-
peals, the affidavits were not admissible as corroboration of the independ-
ent, competent testimony of the bailiff.61 Recognition of this exception 
would have contradicted the holdings of two earlier cases,62 Oxtoby v. 
McGowan 63 and Christ v. Wempe. 64 Further, the court stated in dicta 
that it would not entertain jurors' affidavits supporting their verdict.6s 
The court remarked that if jurors were allowed to support their verdict, 
it would be unfair to deny the losing party the use of countervailing affi-
davits, testimony, and cross-examination impeaching the verdict.66 
The trial judge therefore properly declined to base his ruling on the 
affidavits. His abuse of discretion, however, lay in his failure to differen-
tiate between competent and incompetent evidence.67 The bailiff's testi-
mony concerning his role in supplying the jury with a dictionary was 
competent under precedent set by Christ v. Wempe. 68 Additionally, the 
longhand notes were competent because they originated during, rather 
than after, deliberations.69 The two categories of competent evidence es-
tablished: "(1) that a dictionary was requested and received by the jury; 
(2) the particular dictionary supplied; (3) that it was used by at least one 
57. General Motors Corp. v. Wernsing, 54 Md. App. 19,456 A.2d 939 (1983), ajJ'd on 
other grounds, 298 Md. 406, 470 A.2d 802 (1984). 
58. Wernsing, 298 Md. at 408, 470 A.2d at 803. The exclusion of the bystander's affida-
vit, id. at 412, 470 A.2d at 805, comports with Zeller v. Mayson, 168 Md. 663, 179 
A. 179 (1935). 
59. Wernsing, 298 Md. at 411-12, 470 A.2d at 805. 
60. [d. at 412, 470 A.2d at 805. The court of special appeals reasoned that to exclude 
the affidavits in the face of the jurors' "manifest misinterpretation of legal terminol-
ogy would be an unconscionable denial of the appellant's [sic] right to a fair trial." 
General Motors Corp. v. Wernsing, 54 Md. App. at 30, 456 A.2d at 945. Addition-
ally, the court of special appeals admitted the affidavits on the ground that they 
mert:ly corroborated the "errant" bailiff's testimony. [d. at 411-12, 470 A.2d at 805. 
61. Wernsing, 298 Md. at 412, 470 A.2d at 805. 
62. [d. 
63. 294 Md. 83, WI, 447 A.2d 860, 870 (1982). 
64. 219 Md. 627, 641, 150 A.2d 918,925 (1959). 
65. Wernsing, 298 Md. at 416, 470 A.2d at 807. 
66. [d. There is an error in the text of the opinion. In the ~ntence beginning "If the lid 
on this can of worms is partially lifted," id., the phrase, "the party opposing a new 
trial," should read "the party seeking a new trial." 
67. [d. at 414, 470 A.2d at 806. 
68. [d. at 413, 470 A.2d at 805 (citing Christ v. Wempe, 219 Md. 627, 642, 150 A.2d 
918, 926 (1959». 
69. Wernsing, 298 Md. at 413, 470 A.2d at 805 (observing that the notes did not "suffer 
the taint of possible post-verdict importuning"). 
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juror; and (4) the particular definition considered."70 
Considering the competent evidence, the court approved the "near 
universal" view that a jury's use of a dictionary warrants a new trial only 
if it results in prejudice to the movant. 71 The court next undertook the 
task of deciding the type of proof necessary to show prejudice. It rejected 
the minority approach of presuming prejudice from the mere presence of 
a dictionary in the jury room.72 The court noted that when a jury's expo-
sure to extraneous matter occurs before the jury retires, Maryland courts 
do not presume prejudice in ruling on a resulting motion for mistrial. 73 
To presume prejudice in the context of a motion for new trial would be 
inconsistent with the approach used in mistrial motions.74 More impor-
tantly, the Wernsing court sought to strike a balance between the stric-
tures of the nonimpeachment rule and the right to a fair trial. 75 If the 
movant enjoyed a presumption of prejudice merely by establishing that 
the jury considered extraneous matter, Maryland's nonimpeachment rule 
would preclude successful rebuttal - the movant would almost invaria-
bly prevai1.76 
For a similar reason, the court rejected the Wemsings' argument 
that the movant must prove prejudice in fact. Under that standard, the 
nonimpeachment rule would block the movant's access to essential proof 
and the party opposing the motion would enjoy a disproportionate ad-
vantage.77 In the interest of balance, therefore, the court adopted a test 
that "looks to the probability of prejudice from the face of the extraneous 
matter in relation to the circumstances of the particular case. "78 
The Wernsing court acknowledged that the case possessed unusual 
facts.79 Due to the foreman's longhand copy of the dictionary definition, 
the evidence in Wernsing was similar to that which would be produced in 
a jurisdiction permitting jurors to describe extraneous matter but not its 
70. [d. at 418-19, 470 A.2d at 808. 
71. See id. at 414-15, 470 A.2d at 806. 
72. [d. at 416, 470 A.2d at 807. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. ("In those circumstances prejudice is not presumed; rather the test is 'whether 
the conversations [with non-jurors] were of such a nature that their effect must 
fairly be held to have been to deprive the injured party of a fair and impartial trial"') 
[punctuation omitted] (quoting Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Smith, 222 Md. 206, 217, 159 
A.2d 823, 829 (1960) and Rent-A-Car Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 163 
Md. 401, 409, 163 A. 702, 705 (1933». 
The Wernsing court's analogy to mistrial motions is inappropriate because 
before ruling on a mistrial motion, trial judges may interrogate jurors, even as to 
their mental processes. Prejudice, therefore, need not be presumed because it can be 
affirmatively proven. See supra note 34. 
75. Wernsing, 298 Md. at 419-20, 470 A.2d at 809. 
76. [d. at 416, 470 A.2d at 807. 
77. [d. at 418, 470 A.2d at 808 ("In effect petitioners urge that prejudice can only be 
shown by demonstrating that one or more jurors were in fact influenced by legally 
incorrect material found in a dictionary. As a practical matter, meeting such a 
standard would seem to be impossible ... in Maryland .... "). 
78. [d. at 419-20, 470 A.2d at 809. 
79. [d. at 420, 470 A.2d at 809. 
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impact on the verdict. 80 In formulating the probability of prejudice stan-
dard, the court relied heavily upon cases from two such jurisdictions, 81 as 
well as a case in which the court had effectively presumed prejudice by 
speculating as to which dictionary definitions the jury consulted. 82 These 
three decisions and others examined by the court83 had assessed the po-
tential for prejudice, in large measure, by comparing the dictionary defi-
nitions to the legally acceptable definitions. The court of appeals adopted 
this approach.84 The possibility of even one juror having misconstrued 
proximate/legal cause as meaning "often without basis in actual fact," 
thus ignoring all of the evidence concerning one of the case's major liabil-
ity issues, entitled the defendants in Wernsing to a new trial. 85 
The court of appeals's refusal to relax Maryland's rule excluding 
jurors' post-verdict affidavits is unfortunate. Courts and commentators 
have long criticized the rule:86 it hypocritically tolerates eavesdropping 
by bailiffs and other non-jurors, yet silences honest jurors who would 
report their own misconduct. 87 The Iowa rule, permitting jurors to de-
scribe overt acts of misconduct, possesses sounder reasoning. Jurors can 
provide the best evidence of irregularities in the jury room88 and fellow 
jurors can readily corroborate or contradict their evidence.89 Further-
more, the Iowa rule does no disservice to the policies traditionally cited 
in support of Lord Mansfield's rule.90 Indeed, allowing jurors to describe 
overt acts of misconduct would deter jury tampering, as well as harass-
ment of and perjury by jurors, yet not inhibit frankness and freedom of 
proper discussion among them, thus ultimately promoting public confi-
dence in the judicial process.91 
Considering the refusal of the court of appeals to relax the strict 
nonimpeachment rule, its reasoning in adopting the probable prejUdice 
test is suspect. In adopting that standard, the court relied upon prece-
80. Id. at 419, 470 A.2d at 808. 
81. Id. at 419, 470 A.2d at 808-09 (citing Palestroni v. Jacobs, 10 N.J. Super. 266, 77 
A.2d 183 (1950); State v. Ott, 111 Wis. 2d 691,331 N.W.2d 629 (1983». 
82. 298 Md. at 418, 470 A.2d at 808 (citing Gertz v. Bass, 59 Ill. App. 2d 180, 208 
N.E.2d 113 (1965». 
83. Wernsing, 298 Md. at 417, 470 A.2d at 807-08. 
84. Id. at 417-18, 470 A.2d at 808 ("In the matter sub judice there is a very substantial 
difference between the trial judge's use of 'legal cause' as synonymous with proxi-
mate cause and the dictionary definition copied .... "). 
85. /d. at 420, 470 A.2d at 809. 
86. Early criticisms by American courts occur, for example, in Smith v. Cheetham, 3 
Cal. R. 57, 59 (N.Y. 1805); Crawford v. State, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 60,67 (1821). See 
a/so, J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, at 699. 
87. J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, at 699. Wigmore also points out that the rule sprang 
from neither policy nor precedent. Id. at 696. 
88. Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 211-12 (1866). 
89. Id. at 211; Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 545 (1874); State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 
100, 118 A.2d 812, 816 (1955). 
90. E.g., Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 545 (1874); State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 99,118 
A.2d 812, 816 (1955); see supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text (listing these 
policies). 
91. See Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 211 (1866). 
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dent from jurisdictions in which jurors are permitted to describe extrane-
ous matter, and upon a case in which the court effectively presumed 
prejudice. The court of appeals, however, refused either to presume prej-
udice or to permit any exception to the nonimpeachment rule.92 The 
court's finding of probable prejudice thus resulted, and could only have 
resulted, from the unlikely existence of a juror's note that was competent 
even under the strict nonimpeachment rule. Absent such an unlikely cir-
cumstance, the court's adoption of the probable prejudice standard from 
precedent that also does not adhere to the strict nonimpeachment rule 
sets a standard difficult, if not impossible, to meet. 
Given Maryland's rigid adherence to the nonimpeachment rule, the 
Wernsing court's probable prejudice test represents a conscientious at-
tempt to compromise between the two extremes of presuming prejudice 
on one hand, and requiring proof of prejUdice in fact on the other.93 The 
probable prejudice test also comports with the extant Maryland law on 
juror misconduct. 94 
The facts of Wernsing and the language of the opinion compel the 
conclusion that in future "dictionary" cases, Maryland's appellate courts 
will interfere with the exercise of the trial court's discretion in ruling 
upon a new trial motion only where competent evidence completely iden-
tifies the extraneous definition. Because of the longhand copy, the 
Wernsing court knew precisely to which use the offending dictionary was 
put. Additionally, the test articulated by the Wernsing court - assessing 
the probability of prejUdice "from the face of the extraneous matter"9S 
(emphasis added) - seems to presuppose knowledge of the particular 
definition and dictionary involved. Jurors rarely make pre-verdict, long-
hand copies of the definitions they consult,96 and Maryland's strict 
nonimpeachment rule bars them from revealing even that much informa-
tion to the court. For these reasons, Wernsing is likely to have a very 
limited application. 
Laurell Kalvan 
92. Wemsing v. General Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406,418-19,470 A.2d 802, 808-09. 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77. 
94. See supra note 34. 
95. Wemsing v. General Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 419-20,470 A.2d 802, 809 (1984). 
In adopting the probability of prejudice test, however, the court of appeals gave 
considerable attention to two cases from other states in which the competent evi-
dence was less thorough than that in Wernsing: Gertz v. Bass, 59 Ill. App. 2d 180, 
208 N.E.2d 113 (1965), and State v. Ott, III Wis. 2d 691,331 N.W.2d 629 (1983). 
The Gertz court in effect presumed prejudice by speculating which terms the jury 
looked up. Gertz, 59 Ill. App. 2d at 185, 208 N.E.2d at 116 ("It is reasonable to 
infer from the fact that the jury specifically requested the dictionary, that they made 
use of the volume in determining the meaning of the crucial terms and were influ-
enced thereby .... "). The Ott court knew which term the jury looked up, but not 
the particular dictionary involved. Ott, 111 Wis. 2d at 695,696,331 N.W.2d at 631, 
632 (holding probability of prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal). 
96. See, e.g., Annot., 54 A.L.R.2n 738 (1957). 
